Guide
CISA KEV additions, Nov 10 to Nov 13, 2026: what was added and how to triage
CISA added eight exploited CVEs to the KEV Catalog on November 10 and 13, 2026. Here is what the alerts list and what BOD 26-04 asks agencies to do.
What CISA added
Between November 10 and November 13, 2026, CISA published two alerts that together add eight CVEs to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog.
CISA's alert dated November 10, 2026 says the agency added six vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
A second alert, dated November 13, 2026, says CISA added two more on the same basis.
For each entry, the alerts give three things: the CVE number, the vendor and product, and CISA's name for the type of weakness. The sections below keep that wording so teams can match each entry against their own asset records. The rest of this briefing covers what the alerts say about deadlines and required actions, and how the directive they cite can guide triage.
November 10: six entries
The November 10 alert covers six products from five vendors. Barracuda Networks appears twice.
- CVE-2026-20320 is listed as a Cisco BroadWorks improper restriction of XML external entity reference vulnerability.
- CVE-2026-111560 is listed as an OS command injection vulnerability in multiple Barracuda Networks products.
- CVE-2026-111793 is listed as an incorrect resource transfer between spheres vulnerability in Openwave Messaging Limited Webtop Media Transcoder.
- CVE-2026-116606 is listed as an authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel in the Barracuda Networks Email Security Gateway (ESG).
- CVE-2026-124194 is listed as a Microsoft Office Outlook missing user interaction for potentially unsafe action vulnerability.
- CVE-2026-125350 is listed as a Google Chromium use-after-free vulnerability.
When reading this list, note how often the same vendor or product family appears. Two entries name Barracuda Networks. One of them covers "multiple products" and the other names a specific gateway. A team running Barracuda equipment therefore has two separate entries to check, not one.
November 13: two entries
The November 13 alert is shorter, but it should get the same attention.
The first entry, CVE-2026-114713, is listed as an UnrealIRCd improper neutralization of delimiters vulnerability.
The second, CVE-2026-123039, is listed as an incorrect permission assignment for critical resource vulnerability affecting multiple Check Point products.
As with the Barracuda entry, the Check Point listing names "multiple products," not one. Inventory checks should cover every Check Point product in use, not a single appliance line.
What the alerts say about deadlines and required actions
Neither alert prints a remediation due date next to any of the eight CVEs. Instead, both point to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04, which sets the vulnerability management requirements.
Teams that need a specific date for a specific CVE will not find one in the alert text. The alerts describe the directive's requirements in terms of risk and exposure, not calendar days.
According to both alerts, the directive requires federal agencies to prioritize rapid remediation of high-risk vulnerabilities, specifically KEV-listed CVEs on publicly exposed assets that grant total control of the asset after exploitation.
The same passage says the directive allows agencies to defer action on lower-risk vulnerabilities.
The alerts add that BOD 26-04 sets basic expectations for when agencies must check whether attackers compromised a system before the patch was applied.
This means patching does not always close the task under the directive. In some cases it also triggers a look backward at whether the system was already compromised. The alerts call these "basic expectations" but do not spell out the conditions in their own text.
On scope, the alerts say the directive binds only Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies, but CISA encourages all organizations to adopt risk-based vulnerability management and prioritize remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities.
For teams outside the federal civilian government, the directive is therefore a model they are encouraged to follow, not an obligation.
How to prioritize the eight
Both alerts explain why the catalog matters, calling these types of vulnerabilities a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and a significant risk to the federal enterprise.
The clearest triage method in the documents is the directive's own wording. Apply it to each of the eight entries in turn, using these questions:
- Does the organization run the named product at all, including any of the "multiple products" covered by the Barracuda and Check Point entries?
- Is any affected instance a publicly exposed asset?
- Would successful exploitation give an attacker total control of that asset?
- If the answers to the last two questions are yes, does the case also call for checking whether the system was compromised before the patch was applied?
- If the answers are no, does the entry fall into the lower-risk group that the directive allows agencies to defer?
The alerts do not say which of the eight entries meet the "publicly exposed" or "total control" tests. Those answers depend on each organization's own systems and how they are deployed.
For that reason, the same CVE can belong at the top of one team's queue and lower in another's. An internet-facing instance of an affected product is a different case from an internal one. The directive's language makes exposure and total control the deciding factors.
Being listed in the KEV Catalog is the starting signal in both alerts. CISA ties every addition to evidence of active exploitation, and it encourages all organizations to prioritize these entries. The directive's tests then decide the order of work within that group.
Watching for further additions
The eight entries from November 10 and November 13 will not be the last. Both alerts say CISA will keep adding vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet its criteria.
The alerts also set the bar for inclusion: a CVE ID, evidence of exploitation, and clear mitigation guidance.
Teams that know of an exploited vulnerability missing from the catalog can submit it through CISA's KEV Nomination Form.
Those three criteria also explain how the catalog works as a triage tool. Each entry has an identifier, proof of exploitation and a known mitigation path. That makes each one a concrete, actionable item, unlike an unconfirmed report.
Sources
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